Gene drive gone wild: exploring deliberative possibilities by developing One Health ethics

@article{0d356e8e31284af3bfc5e595b73a6352,

title = "Gene drive gone wild: exploring deliberative possibilities by developing One Health ethics",

author = "Benjamin Capps",

note = "Funding Information: In this paper, I contextualised a critique of community engagement (CE) using Kevin Esvelt{\textquoteright}s proposal for public support to determine the future of gene drive trials. 122 That is a reasonable condition for proceeding with a risky trial where there is going to be concern from the local population. The approach is limited by the fact of plurality, so public consensus consigns dissenters to betray their fundamental beliefs; that is, they take on an equal burden of responsibility, should the worst happen. My response to this predicament is reaffirming collective consent within ideal deliberation: rights, the public good, and the public interest; these have all been defined and defended here. The further problem, however, is how deliberation handles various dichotomies stemming from culture and nature: the gene drive controversy is one of improving the health of agents within a system, and the risks of introducing ecological damage into that system. One Health (OH) ethics, in this respect, shifts debate from improving the human condition in the first instance, to the significance of unintended or unforeseen events caused to ecologies. In public health, these questions are resolved by indicia in human interests and ecological services. But, in the Anthropocene, despite our repeated efforts to dominate nature, our encroachment on wild areas or reckless pollution makes nature seem ever more threatening, and it is hard to shift that from public imaginations. OH ethics enables us to better understand the extent to which humans are connected to and dependent on nature, 123 and therefore promises a different pathway for engaging communities. After various proposals to undertake gene drive field trials, Esvelt has expressed reservations in at least one use: conservation. 124 That postscript underlines the concern that gene drives, at present, lack control mechanisms and are likely remarkably effective. Esvelt{\textquoteright}s claim is that conservation is not sufficiently important to risk ecological damage, explaining that off-target species {\textquoteleft}underpin important ecosystem services{\textquoteright} and may have {\textquoteleft}cultural significance and value to many{\textquoteright}. 125 That opinion, and his {\textquoteleft}expert{\textquoteright} status, place him prominently on a strategic map: but while the first claim is descriptive of public goods strived for, the second is evaluative. 126 Contradictory to his views, some jurisdictions are actively considering gene drives as a valid approach to species conservation. 127 Elsewhere, we are assured that gene drive applications – justified by economic criteria – may substantially improve human wellbeing. 128 But the risk, as Esvelt points out, is that any gene drive would likely hybridise with off-target animals, and these animals, in different locations, may be more or less {\textquoteleft}valued{\textquoteright}. Value, here, is subjective. It is in this context that consideration of the weight of a community{\textquoteright}s consensus and reasonable choices is imperative, but these decisions must be made (even limited) in respect to conditions for rights, the public good and the public interest. With the conditions spelled out here, I have argued that CE does not in/validate any trial: it provides an ethical procedure given the myriad of internal and external influences discussed in this paper. In that respect, expertise is required to predict gene drive phenomena and specify obligations to ethical norms and environmental laws. 129 OH is well placed to advocate for these inclusions. Policy is scripted by a strategic roadmap: in public health there is more likely to be a consensus route because of the narrow scope for legitimate activities – the prerequisite condition of protecting human health, defined by experts{\textquoteright} opinions and the public interest. OH ethics is a coextensive pathway to that of public health: it promotes CE to explore local ecosystems, local expertise, and local politics; it attests to the fact that no scientist or official can know these consequences without appreciating broad knowledge. If the gene drive debate is framed by OH, then ethical procedures are less likely to crowd out these opinions. I have gone a step further in framing OH ethics by positioning it as for the public good. Because the public good is derivative of rights, then it underpins problems of collective consent and issues raised in CE. Moreover, by reframing the duality of public health-environmentalism issues, OH ethics provides conditions for balancing competing interests and the public interest. OH challenges the inadequacy of public health when balancing complex animal-human-environmental issues: questions that cross animal-human interests, future generations and ecological impacts. Given proper scope, OH ethics addresses broad conditions for health, in terms of sustainable and stable ecosystem services, and supports social and political activism that values natural systems, within which are found competitors, predators and symbioses. OH might be a more prudent approach to environmental degradation and enhancement, and could retune the gene drive narrative to environmental concepts such as complexity or sustainability. OH could reframe the debate from one about the marvel and boundless opportunities of {\textquoteleft}precision editing{\textquoteright} premised on {\textquoteleft}tinkering with ecosystems to make them friendlier to humans{\textquoteright}, 130 to an ecological-friendly one acknowledging the significance of nature as a public good and life support. Positioning OH coextensively on the public health strategic roadmap, therefore, would be advantageous in adjudicating the ethical circumstances for CE in creating gene drive policy. The benefits of gene drives are possible but so-far imaginary; the risks are all too well known in human endeavours to {\textquoteleft}improve{\textquoteright} nature. For the sake of the public good and all of our existence, before they are released into the wild, I would recommend cautious appraisal using the OH ethical framework I have defended here. 1 Anne Deredec, Austin Burt and HCJ Godfray, {\textquoteleft}The Population Genetics of Using Homing Endonuclease Genes in Vector and Pest Management{\textquoteright} (2008) 179 Genetics 2013. 2 Jeffry Sander and Keith Joung, {\textquoteleft}CRISPR-Cas Systems for Editing, Regulating and Targeting Genomes{\textquoteright} (2014) 32 Nature Biotechnology 347. 3 John Min, Andrea Smidler, Devora Najjar and Kevin Esvelt, {\textquoteleft}Harnessing Gene Drive{\textquoteright} (2018) 5(sup.1) Journal of Responsible Innovation S40. 4 On the nefarious uses of {\textquoteleft}extinction{\textquoteright} technologies, see: Ewan Callaway, {\textquoteleft}US Defense Agencies Grapple with Gene Drives{\textquoteright} (2017) 547 Nature 388. 5 These opinions are discussed in: Kent Redford, William Adams and Georgian Mace, {\textquoteleft}Synthetic Biology and Conservation of Nature: Wicked Problems and Wicked Solutions{\textquoteright} (2013) 11(4) PLOS Biology e1001530; Richard Helliwell, Sarah Hartley, Warren Pearce and Liz O{\textquoteright}Neill, {\textquoteleft}Why are NGOs Sceptical of Genome Editing?{\textquoteright} (2017) EMBO Reports e201744385. 6 Min and others (n 3). 7 National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NAS), Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values (National Academies Press, 2016) Chapter 7. 8 Community Engagement (CE) involves {\textquoteleft}publics{\textquoteright} in the mutual exchange of knowledge, before allowing them, in this present case, to determine the initiation and conduct of a gene drive field trial. CE is part of the wider process of public engagement. For a general description of benefits, perils and pitfalls of CE, see: Lindsey Reynolds and Salla Sariola, {\textquoteleft}The Ethics and Politics of Community Engagement in Global Health Research{\textquoteright} (2018) 28 Critical Public Health 257. CE is a feature of various theories of discursive and inclusive deliberation, and deliberative democracy – which variously describe ideals of governance. I use deliberative ethics to broadly mean any of these theoretical approaches. My approach uses ideal deliberation , another theory in the family of deliberative ethics, where manifest equality among citizens – created by the relevant features of having rights and duties – is a precondition of the public good. Read this way, CE creates a space for dissemination, engagement and polling; it is partly mandated because it is {\textquoteleft}inclusive{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}fair{\textquoteright}, but also because it is geared towards understanding (and implementing through policy) deliberators{\textquoteright} moral positioning in respect to the responsibilities broadly required by the apparatuses of the democratic state; see generally, Joshua Cohen, {\textquoteleft}Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy{\textquoteright} in Derek Matravers and Jonathan Pike (eds), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Routledge, 2003) 342–60. 9 I use {\textquoteleft}the public{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}publics{\textquoteright} interchangeably to include specific publics, activist publics, affected publics, interested and disinterested publics, and so on. 10 For example, see, e.g. NAS (n 7) that proposes a roadmap from start to finish: Although the overall goal is for unidirectional movement from early to later phases, the pathway includes a set of feedback loops, to encourage repetition and refinement of studies based on new findings and data generated during the course of research. The phased testing pathway enables a researcher to identify milestones and decision points in regard to when the research is ready to move from one phase to the next. The decision to advance to the next phase of testing may also depend on approval from relevant publics, particularly local communities and regulatory authorities (86–87). … First, risk assessment is thorough and includes a variety of experts. … robust models of risk assessment can inform decision makers at each level of governance (150). … Second, a process to engage affected communities and broader publics feeds into the governance process (151). … Third, clear lines of authority and responsibility and methods for accountability are essential to good governance. … clear lines of authority and responsibility will be even more important, both in terms of the effects of gene drives and decision making about them. Accountability as a norm aims at generating desired performance through control and oversight, facilitating ethical behavior, and promoting democratic governance through institutional reforms. (151) 11 That map might also include {\textquoteleft}national interests{\textquoteright} (i.e. security) or {\textquoteleft}economic interests{\textquoteright}. 12 Sheila Jasanoff, Benjamin Hurlbut and Krishanu Saha, {\textquoteleft}CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Need for Inclusive Deliberation{\textquoteright} (2015) 32 Issues in Science and Technology 25. 13 See generally: Michael Carpini, Fay Cook and Lawrence Jacobs, {\textquoteleft}Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature{\textquoteright} (2004) 7 Annual Review of Political Science 315. 14 Franz Seifert, {\textquoteleft}Local Steps in an International Career: A Danish-Style Consensus Conference in Austria{\textquoteright} (2006) 15 Public Understanding of Science 73. 15 J Zinsstag, E Schelling, D Waltner-Toews and M Tanner, {\textquoteleft}From “One Medicine” to “One Health” and Systemic Approaches to Health and Well-Being{\textquoteright} (2011) 101 Preventative Veterinary Medicine 148. 16 Benjamin Capps, Michelle Bailey, David Bickford and others, {\textquoteleft}Introducing One Health to the Ethical Debate about Zoonotic Diseases in South East Asia{\textquoteright} (2015) 29 Bioethics 588. 17 See also: Aysha Akhtara, {\textquoteleft}The Need to Include Animal Protection in Public Health Policies{\textquoteright} (2013) 34 Journal of Public Health Policy 549. 18 Kevin Esvelt, Andrea Smidler, Flaminia Catteruccia and George Church, {\textquoteleft}Emerging Technology: Concerning RNE-Guided Gene Drives for the Alteration of Wild Populations{\textquoteright} (2014) eLife doi: 10.7554/eLife.o3401 ; Jackson Champer, Anna Buchman and Omar Akbari, {\textquoteleft}Cheating Evolution: Engineering Gene Drives to Manipulate the Fate of Wild Populations{\textquoteright} (2016) 17 Nature Review Genetics 146. 19 Charelston Noble, Jason Olejarz, Kevin Esvelt and others, {\textquoteleft}Evolutionary Dynamics of CRISPR Gene Drives{\textquoteright} (2017) 3(4) Scientific Advances e1601964; Robert Unckless, Andrew Clark and Philipp Messer, {\textquoteleft}Evolution of Resistance against CRISPR/Cas9 Gene Drive{\textquoteright} (2017) 205 Genetics 827. 20 A successful gene drive trail requires: resolving effective gene delivery into wild species at the population level; protecting off-target species (such as relying on specificity or developing {\textquoteleft}immunising{\textquoteright} drives); controlling temporal gene expression (i.e. programmed degradation of drives over generations); and opportunities to reverse inherited effects should they become unwelcome; John Marshall, {\textquoteleft}The Effect of Gene Drive on Containment of Transgenic Mosquitoes{\textquoteright} (2009) 258 Journal of Theoretical Biology 250; Charleston Noble, Ben Adlam, George Church and others, {\textquoteleft}Current CRISPR Gene Drive Systems are Likely to be Highly Invasive in Wild Populations{\textquoteright} (2018) eLife 7:e33423. 21 Decisions to use technologies are often anchored in their given purposes – in respect to gene drives, these might be public health, defence, or conservation. These purposes justify different imperatives (or ethical arguments): human health, security, or species protection. But the justifications may not be mutually inclusive; in fact, it is likely to be quite the opposite: technologies are transferable so that preferential use in one area can be adapted to another. Thus, if it is decided that the conditions for ethical use lie in human health, for instance, then one might expect its eventual use in militarisation or conservation; Min and others (n 3). 22 David Resnik, {\textquoteleft}Ethical Issues in Field Trials of Genetically Modified Disease Resistant Mosquitoes{\textquoteright} (2014) 14 Developing World Bioethics 37. 23 David Norton, Laura Young, Andrea Byrom and others, {\textquoteleft}How do we Restore New Zealand{\textquoteright}s Biological Heritage by 2050?{\textquoteright} (2016) 17 Ecological Management & Restoration 170. 24 John Mulvihill, Benjamin Capps, Yann Joly and others, {\textquoteleft}Ethical Issues of CRISPR Technology and Gene Editing through the Lens of Solidarity{\textquoteright} (2017) 122 British Medical Bulletin 17. 25 NAS (n 7). 26 Ann Ran, Patrick Hsu, Jason Wright and others, {\textquoteleft}Genome Engineering using the CRISPR-Cas9 System{\textquoteright} (2013) 8 Nature Protocols 2281. 27 Allison Snow, David Andow, Paul Gepts and others, {\textquoteleft}Genetically Engineered Organisms and the Environment: Current Status and Recommendations{\textquoteright} (2005) 15 Ecological Applications 377; Michael Specter, {\textquoteleft}Rewriting the Code of Life{\textquoteright} (2017) Annals of Science January 2. 28 Patricia Marshall and Charles Rotimi, {\textquoteleft}Ethical Challenges in Community-based Research{\textquoteright} (2001) 322 American Journal of the Medical Sciences 259; Kevin Esvelt and Neil Gemmell, {\textquoteleft}Conservation Demands Safe Gene Drive{\textquoteright} (2017) 15(11) PLoS Biology e20003850. 29 Ronald Atlas, {\textquoteleft}One Health: Its Origins and Future{\textquoteright} in John Mackenzie, Martin Jeggo, Peter Daszak and Juergen Richt (eds), One Health: The Human-Animal-Environment Interfaces in Emerging Infectious Diseases (Springer, 2013) 1–13; Henrik Lerner and Charlotte Berg, {\textquoteleft}The Concept of Health in One Health and Some Practical Implications for Research and Education: What is One Health?{\textquoteright} (2015) 5 Infection Ecology & Epidemiology doi: 10.3402/iee.v5.25300 . 30 E.g. S.2634 – One Health Act of 2016; 114th Congress (2015–2016), www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2634/text . 31 Melissa Leach and Ian Scoones, {\textquoteleft}The Social and Political Lives of Zoonotic Disease Models: Narratives, Science and Policy{\textquoteright} (2013) 88 Social Science & Medicine 10. 32 Maria Lapinski, Julie Funk and Lauren Moccia, {\textquoteleft}Recommendations for the Role of Social Science Research in One Health{\textquoteright} (2015) 129 Social Science & Medicine 51. 33 Capps and others (n 16). 34 Daniel Goldberg, {\textquoteleft}In Support of a Broad Model of Public Health: Disparities, Social Epidemiology and Public Health Causation{\textquoteright} (2009) 2 Public Health Ethics 70; Steve Hinchliffe, {\textquoteleft}More than One World, More than One Health: Re-configuring Interspecies Health{\textquoteright} (2015) 129 Social Science & Medicine 28; Sarah Baum, Catherine Machalaba, Peter Daszak and others. {\textquoteleft}Evaluating One Health: Are we Demonstrating Effectiveness?{\textquoteright} (2017) 3 One Health 5. 35 In this sense, I am primarily focussed on {\textquoteleft}the environment{\textquoteright} as separate from non-social factors (i.e. not the social determinants of health that are rightly located in public health). 36 {\textquoteleft}Impacts on human health{\textquoteright} are standard parameters for public health debate, even when there are significant environmental issues, as identified by: Tamra Lysaght, Benjamin Capps, Michele Bailey and others, {\textquoteleft}Justice Is the Missing Link in One Health: Results of a Mixed Methods Study in an Urban City State{\textquoteright} (2017) 12(1) PLoS ONE e0170967; and subsequently confirmed in: Chris Degeling, Jane Johnson, Michael Ward and others, {\textquoteleft}A Delphi Survey and Analysis of Expert Perspectives on One Health in Australia{\textquoteright} (2017) 14 Ecohealth 783. 37 Bernice Bovenkerk, Joost van Herten and Marcel Verweij, {\textquoteleft}The Animal Factor in Human Health{\textquoteright} (2017) 17 American Journal of Bioethics 28. 38 Robert Costanza, Ralph d{\textquoteright}Arge, Rudolf de Groot and others, {\textquoteleft}The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital{\textquoteright} (1997) 387 Nature 253. 39 Janet Fang, {\textquoteleft}A World without Mosquitoes{\textquoteright} (2010) 466 Nature 432. 40 Resnik (n 22); Carolyn Neuhous and Arthur Caplan, {\textquoteleft}Genome Editing: Bioethics Shows the Way{\textquoteright} (2017) 35 Nature Biotechnology 713. 41 Kevin Esvelt, {\textquoteleft}Gene Editing Can Drive Science to Openness{\textquoteright} (2016) 534 Nature 153. 42 Ibid, 153. 43 These are: Develop interventions whose benefits are obvious to most citizens; Invite public discussion of proposed projects before experiments begin; Clearly detail safeguards that will be used; Transparently address community concerns during the development cycle; and Ensure that early applications are community-directed and non-profit; Min and others (n 3). 44 Esvelt has a sound record in seeking public support for his trials via consultation with communities, whose woes – emanating from wild pathogens, pests, and invasive organisms – are plausible targets of gene drives. It is not my purpose to disparage his efforts to involve publics in his research – but to direct critical consideration to the limits of a broad frame for CE. 45 However, the vast literature of CE points to a rather more narrow idea of {\textquoteleft}discursive participation{\textquoteright}: (1) discourse is with and between other citizens; (2) discourse is a form of participation; (3) participation can include but is not limited to the formal institutions and processes of civic and political life; (4) discursive participation can occur through a variety of media; and (5) it is focused on local, national, or international issues of public concern; Brian Head, {\textquoteleft}Community Engagement: Participation on Whose Terms?{\textquoteright} (2008) 42 Australian Journal of Political Science 441; also see: Carpini and others (n 13). 46 Jasanoff and others (n 12). 47 Ibid. 48 Neuhous and Caplan (n 40) 716. 49 Ibid, 716. 50 National Research Council (NRC) Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making (The National Academies Press, 2008). 51 Resnik (n 22). 52 Marshall and Rotimi (n 28). 53 Elinor Ostrom, {\textquoteleft}Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems{\textquoteright} (2010) 100 American Economic Review 641. 54 Lisa Palmer, {\textquoteleft}Genetically Modified Mosquito Sparks a Controversy in Florida{\textquoteright} (2015) 360 Yale Environment June 4 www.e360.yale.edu/features/genetically_modified_mosquito_sparks_a_controversy_in_florida (accessed 20 March 2019). 55 There are a number of assumptions behind this: communities make definitive decisions, so that good and bad (ethical) reasons matter, whereas individuals may remain undecided – perhaps to their own peril – but that is not an option for policy where even laissez faire is policy; people are invested in contexts despite plurality; and democracy provides different sources, or centres, of authority – from cultural representations, to local and central government. 56 Neuhous and Caplan (n 40) 716. 57 Ibid. 58 Samantha Besson, The Morality of Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2005) 225–326. 59 Maui Hudson, {\textquoteleft}Think Globally, Act Locally: Collective Consent and the Ethics of Knowledge Production{\textquoteright} (2009) 60 International Social Science Journal 125, 131. 60 See generally: Benjamin Capps, {\textquoteleft}Authoritative Regulation and the Stem Cell Debate{\textquoteright} (2008) 22 Bioethics 43. 61 Ostrom (n 53). 62 Roger Brownsword, {\textquoteleft}The Cult of Consent: Fixation and Fallacy{\textquoteright} (2004) 15 King{\textquoteright}s Law Journal 223. 63 Capps (n 60) 53. 64 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (20th Printing) (CUP, 2001 (1990)) 2. 65 The state has a role in creating space for negotiating, providing neutral information, enforcement, and monitoring and sanctioning; also see, Ostrom 2010 (n 53); Elinor Ostrom, {\textquoteleft}Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change{\textquoteright} (2010) 20 Global Environmental Change 550. Also see: Walter Block and Ivan Jankovic {\textquoteleft}Tragedy of the Partnership: A Critique of Elinor Ostrom{\textquoteright} (2016) 75 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 289. 66 Ostrom (n 64) 14. 67 Niels Mejlgaard, {\textquoteleft}The Trajectory of Scientific Citizenship in Denmark: Changing Balances between Public Competence and Public Participation{\textquoteright} (2009) 36 Science and Public Policy 483. 68 Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). 69 Cohen (n 8) 344. 70 Capps (n 60). 71 Legitimacy is whether an adequate moral or ethical justification is available; Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP, 2008). These are narrower arguments than those provided as legitimation as a broad set of potentially justifying reasons for regulatory action. The latter are often appeals to a public, national or economic interest, such as those spelled out in policy as {\textquoteleft}ethical{\textquoteright} or {\textquoteleft}legal{\textquoteright} reasoning. 72 Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton University Press, 1993) 167. 73 Evidence shows that {\textquoteleft}when individuals are well informed about the problem they face and about who else is involved, and can build settings where trust and reciprocity can emerge, grow, and be sustained over time, costly and positive actions are frequently taken without waiting for an external authority to impose rules, monitor compliance, and assess penalties{\textquoteright}; Ostrom (n 65) 555. 74 Michael Sandel, Justice: What{\textquoteright}s the Right Thing to Do? (Penguin Books Ltd, 2009) 269. My emphasis. 75 Martin Hollis, Reason in Action (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 169. 76 See also: Richard Ashcroft, {\textquoteleft}Incentives, Nudges and the Burden of Proof in Ethical Argument{\textquoteright} (2017) 43 Journal of Medical Ethics 137. 77 Benjamin Capps, {\textquoteleft}The Public Interest, Public Goods, and Third-Party Access to UK Biobank{\textquoteright} (2012) 5 Public Health Ethics 240. 78 Besson (n 58). 79 Friederike Hendriks, Dorothe Kienhues and Rainer Bromme {\textquoteleft}Measuring Laypeople{\textquoteright}s Trust in Experts in a Digital Age: The Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI){\textquoteright} (2015) 10(10) PLoS One e0139309. 80 Thomas Fossen, {\textquoteleft}Agonistic Critiques of Liberalism: Perfection and Emancipation{\textquoteright} (2008) 7 Contemporary Political Theory 376. 81 Dorothy Nelkin, {\textquoteleft}Beyond Risk: Reporting about Genetics in the Post-Asilomar Press{\textquoteright} (2001) 44 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 199. 82 Redford and others (n 5). 83 Gregory Kaebnick, {\textquoteleft}Human Gene Editing Report: Moving Forward Incrementally{\textquoteright} The Hastings Center: Bioethics Forum Essay (14 February 2017) www.thehastingscenter.org/human-gene-editing-report-moving-forward-incrementally/ (accessed 12 July 2018). 84 Some basic ground needs to be covered: under a so-called {\textquoteleft}will conception{\textquoteright}, rights are not obtained by agreement but are an ultimate source of legitimacy; legitimacy derives from facts about agency which entail the conditions for having rights. That is, rights are apodictic to agency; Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago University Press, 1978) 44–46. 85 In the sense that for both authority and positioning, participants are morally committed to the generic conditions of agency, and communities are committed to policies that are prima facie egalitarian; ibid. 86 To understand an approximation of this approach, see: Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun Pattinson, {\textquoteleft}Defending Moral Precaution as a Solution to the Problem of Other Minds: A Reply to Holm and Coggon{\textquoteright} (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 258. 87 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 88 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation , 2/e (Avon Books 1990). 89 Mickey Gjerris and Christian Gamborg, {\textquoteleft}Is there More to Life than Welfare? How the Concept of Animal Integrity can Contribute to Discussions of Animal Ethics{\textquoteright} in Carlos M Romeo Casabona, Leire Escajedo San Epifanio and Aitziber Emaldia Ciri{\'o}n (eds), Global Food Security: Ethical and Legal Challenges: EurSafe 2010 (Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2010) 372–77. 90 Melanie Rock and Chris Degeling, {\textquoteleft}Public Health Ethics and More-Than-Human Solidarity{\textquoteright} (2015) 129 Social Science & Medicine 61. 91 However, none of these approaches, if included in an account of OH ethics, prove that animals (or trees, or {\textquoteleft}nature{\textquoteright} – such as rivers) have rights, any more than it is proof that all biologically {\textquoteleft}human beings{\textquoteright} have human rights; e.g. Christopher Stone, {\textquoteleft}Should Trees Have Standing – Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects{\textquoteright} (1972) 45 Southern California Law Review 450. 92 Benjamin Capps and Zohar Lederman, {\textquoteleft}Responding to a Public Health Objection to Vaccinating Great Apes{\textquoteright} (2016) 29 Journal of Agriculture and Environmental Ethics 883. 93 Stuart Toddington, {\textquoteleft}The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory{\textquoteright} (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217. 94 Roger Brownsword, {\textquoteleft}Law and Technology: Two Modes of Disruption, Three Legal Mind-Sets, and the Big Picture of Regulatory Responsibilities{\textquoteright} (2018) 14 Indian Journal of Law and Technology 1, 24. 95 Capps (n 60) 96 Compare: Roger Brownsword, {\textquoteleft}Responsible Regulation: Prudence, Precaution and Stewardship{\textquoteright} (2011) 62 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 573. 97 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 2004 (1977)). 98 {\textquoteleft}For the public good{\textquoteright} uses norms and networks to accumulate social capital that is for the public good – that is, infrastructure is used to accumulate and to distribute welfare. That function is derived from a welfarist account of rights; Benjamin Capps, {\textquoteleft}Public Goods in the Ethical Reconsideration of Research Innovation{\textquoteright} in Patrick Capps and Shaun Pattinson (eds), Ethical Rationalism and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2016) 149–69. 99 The view that OH is coextensive to public health derives from a similar commitment to provide goods through a combination of programs and services that are scientifically informed and promoted on just – and evidence-based – grounds; see generally, Jeffrey Koplan, Christopher Bond, Michael Merson and others, {\textquoteleft}Towards a Common Definition of Global Health{\textquoteright} (2009) 373 Lancet 1993. 100 Capps (n 98). 101 Ibid. 102 Here, one might logically start with the prospective {\textquoteleft}right of nature{\textquoteright} – qua Thomas Hobbes – as claims made, conditional on practical rationality, by a person in order to preserve their life. It then becomes appealing to position the public good in nature in respect to the universality of rights (Hobbes would call these {\textquoteleft}Laws of Nature{\textquoteright}); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (A critical edition by GAJ Rogers and Karl Schuhmann: Continuum 2005 (1651)). However, unlike Hobbes{\textquoteright} world, where rights are contingent on contractual servitude to the state, rights, here, are freedom and wellbeing as distinctive capacities of agency. 103 Brownsword (n 94) 24. 104 Deliberators may adopt a {\textquoteleft}prosocial logic that differs fundamentally from [satisfying] narrow self interest{\textquoteright} Mark Suchman, {\textquoteleft}Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches{\textquoteright} (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 571, 579. That community-orientated attitude is likely a prerequisite for any sustainable outcome, yet it also requires deliberators to risk losing out and betraying their fundamental beliefs; John Finnis, {\textquoteleft}Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse{\textquoteright} (1999) 12 Ratio Juris 354; and a response in Capps (n 60). 105 For discussion: Fossen (n 80). 106 John Coggon, What Makes Health Public? (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 200–201. Persons may be described as something like identities that are valued, not as moral agents, but as indeterminate pluralistic loci inhabiting a visceral socio-political place. 107 Ibid, 226. 108 Fossen (n 80). 109 Coggon (n 106) 263. 110 Alan Gewirth, {\textquoteleft}Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?{\textquoteright} (1998) 11 Social Philosophy and Policy 22. 111 Deryck Beyleveld, Marcus D{\"u}well and Andreas Spahn, {\textquoteleft}Why and How Should We Represent Future Generations in Policymaking?{\textquoteright} (2015) 6 Jurisprudence 549. 112 Today, dogma is often tolerated (or propagandised) despite powerful means to challenge and fact-check, primarily through the ubiquitous Internet. Such views used to lurk in social microcosms, now they are more-than-ever influential as populism; but, as it always has been, dogma promotes exclusivity (and favours antagonism to fuel exclusivity), and, in an era of {\textquoteleft}post fact{\textquoteright}, it has been reinvigorated by a potent renunciation of {\textquoteleft}expertise{\textquoteright}. The rise of emotion, rather than broadly objectivism, as influences shaping public opinion creates an uncertain climate for deliberative democracy. Those skilled in the dogmaitc art of debate are well-versed in toying with the realities that deliberators identify as their own (contestable) values; deliberators have different capacity to know and argue, have different perceptions of collective identity (i.e. whether or not {\textquoteleft}we{\textquoteright} can agree), and their own scope for culturally appropriate authority (who {\textquoteleft}speaks for us{\textquoteright}). The antidotes are procedures for: valid representation; managing confrontation; challenging irrational and unsubstantiated opinions, and ousting mischief, misinformation and bias; and allowing accommodations for dissenters to have access to appeal through formal arbitration and scope for civil protest; Noel Cass and Gordon Walker, {\textquoteleft}Emotion and Rationality: The Characterizsation and Evaluation of Opposition to Renewable Energy Projects{\textquoteright} (2009) 2 Emotion, Space and Society 62; Rikki Dean, {\textquoteleft}Beyond Radicalism and Resignation: The Competing Logics for Public Participation in Policy Decisions{\textquoteright} (2017) 45 Policy and Politics 213; Cameron Hepburn and Alexander Teytelboym, {\textquoteleft}Climate Change Policy after Brexit{\textquoteright} (2017) 33(sup. 1) Oxford Review of Economic Policy S144. These procedures instigate rules – the rule of law or norms – that, unless guaranteed, suggest {\textquoteleft}policy{\textquoteright} is solely to reflect transitory public attitudes: the practical challenge for any liberalism is coping with empirical social snapshots that are reflective, simultaneously, of both the facts and values held by the people. 113 Coggon (n 106) 215. 114 Compare: ibid, 92, 147, 213. 115 Umberto Eco, {\textquoteleft}Ur-Fascism{\textquoteright} New York Review of Books June 22, 1995 Issue. 116 Cohen (n 8). 117 Beyleveld with others (n 111). 118 Robert Hilderbrand, Adam Watts and April Randle, {\textquoteleft}The Myths of Restoration Ecology{\textquoteright} (2005) 10 Ecology and Society 19. 119 Dworkin (n 97). 120 Deryck Beyleveld, {\textquoteleft}Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic Consistency{\textquoteright} (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 15. 121 Brownsword (n 94). 122 Esvelt (n 41); Esvelt and Gemmell (n 28). 123 Gregory Kaebnick, Humans in Nature: The World as We Find It and the World as We Create It (Oxford University Press, 2013). 124 Esvelt and Gemmell (n 28) 4. 125 Ibid, 2 126 The same risks for ecologies and value systems transpire for all uses of gene drives. Using a gene drive for public health purposes is likely to have conservation impacts, as that invasive species integrates with the ecosystem. Thus, rather than finding different uses signal different risks, these risks (like the engineered species itself) are general. Thus, no purposes, if validly agreed to by CE, can be invalidated by contradictory opinion; and in that respect, Esvelt{\textquoteright}s claim to limit gene drives seems opposed to his belief in CE (ibid). 127 Ibid. 128 Paul Mitchell, Zachary Brown and Neil McRoberts, {\textquoteleft}Economic Issues to Consider for Gene Drives{\textquoteright} (2018) 5(sup.1) Journal of Responsible Innovation S180. 129 Nicole Gutzmann, Johanna Elsensohn, Jessica Cavin Barnes and others, {\textquoteleft}CRISPR-Based Gene Drive in Agriculture Will Face Technical and Governance Challenges{\textquoteright} (2017) EMBO Reports doi: 10.15252/embr.201744661 . 130 Eben Kirksey, {\textquoteleft}The CRISPR Hack: Better, Faster, Stronger{\textquoteright} (2016) 8 Anthropology Now 1, 5. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019, {\textcopyright} 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.",

year = "2019",

month = jul,

day = "3",

doi = "10.1080/17579961.2019.1665789",

language = "English",

volume = "11",

pages = "231--256",

journal = "Law, Innovation and Technology",

issn = "1757-9961",

publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",

number = "2",